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ABSTRACT
This thesis project examines the collective memory of Katyń from the midst of the
Second World War to the late twentieth century. Katyń serves as the collective name for the
series of mass executions of over 20,000 Polish soldiers, army officers, policemen, and various
members of the Polish intelligentsia by the NKVD that took place throughout remote sites in the
Soviet Union during the early months of the Second World War. From the discovery of the mass
graves in the Katyń Forest by German forces in 1943, Katyń has been shrouded in contentions,
secrecy, and processes of attempts to unveil the historical truth of the perpetrators of the mass
executions. For nearly five decades, many scholars of Katyń argue that the “truth” of the mass
executions remained hidden. While this claim is not entirely incorrect as the Soviet and Polish
states’ sponsored versions of the truth of the crime’s perpetrators appeared “hidden,” this school
of thought is disingenuous and problematic in its approach in examining contemporaries’
understanding and perceptions of Katyń throughout the latter portion of the twentieth century.
This thesis project argues that to better understand what Katyń was and has been, we must
examine the representations of Katyń from the discovery of the mass graves by German forces in
the Katyń Forest in 1943 to the release of Katyń documents by the Soviet Union in 1990. This
thesis project examines selected representations of Katyń made by the German and Soviet
governments during the Second World War, Polish émigrés living within the United States and
Great Britain during the post-war period, and Poles living within the Polska Rzeczpospolita
Ludowa (PRL) and present-day Poland. Katyń has represented a myriad of meanings in the
collective memories of states and societies throughout time. The understanding, representations,
“truth,” and narratives surrounding Katyń have undoubtedly been influenced by the politics of
memory at every stage of the Katyń story.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Katyń
In present-day Polish collective memory, the Second World War is regarded as the most
traumatic event in modern Polish history.1 Poland experienced catastrophic loss, devastation,
mass death, and suffering as a result of the Second World War. Throughout the near six-year
German and Soviet occupations of the country, over six million Poles were killed, either as a
direct initiative committed by occupying forces or as a result of warfare. During the Nazi state
sponsored genocide known as the Holocaust, approximately three million Jewish Poles, ninety
percent of the pre-war Jewish population, were murdered in ghettos, concentration camps, and
forced marches throughout the occupied territory and greater Europe. Seven to eight percent of
non-Jewish Poles were also murdered during ethnic cleansing initiatives perpetrated by the Nazi
state.2 The country experienced extensive material destruction to cities: the Polish capital of
Warsaw was razed to the ground following the Warsaw Uprising in 1944.3

The First World War ended the century long partition of Poland. Its conclusion enabled
the emergence of an independent Polish state. The commencement of the Second World War
resulted in the partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union, and the devastating
loss of millions of Polish citizens’ lives. At the end of the Second World War, the People’s
Republic of Poland (Polska Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, hereafter the PRL) emerged as an

Andrzej Paczkowski. “The Second World War in Present-Day Polish Memory and Politics,” in The Long
Aftermath: Cultural Legacies of Europe at War, 1936-2016. New York: Berghahn Books. 2016, 277.
1

2

Paczkowski. “The Second World War in Present-Day Polish Memory and Politics,” 277.
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Ibid.
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autonomous, non-democratic state aligned with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).
While the PRL was under the powerful sway of the USSR throughout the Cold War period, the
government of the PRL maintained its own internal affairs and national borders. Following the
collapse of the PRL and the USSR in the early 1990s, an independent, democratic Polish state
emerged as Rzeczpospolita Polska (the Republic of Poland). The effects of the Second World
War still permeate throughout present-day Polish society. Nearly eighty years after the beginning
of the Second World War, events from the war remain important attributes of national identity
making and politics in the Republic of Poland. Events from the war, like the Warsaw Uprising of
1944, are commemorated in nationwide events of remembrance and commemoration of Polish
heroism and martyrdom each year. In present-day Polish collective memory, there remains one
word that immediately signifies immense suffering, anxiety, and loss experienced as a result of
the Second World War: Katyń.
Referred to as one of the “greatest blank spots,” in Polish and Soviet histories, Katyń
serves as the present-day Polish symbol of national suffering, anxiety, and loss experienced
during Poland’s unsettling twentieth century.4 Katyń serves as the collective name for the series
of mass executions of over 20,000 Polish soldiers, army officers, policemen, and various
members of the Polish intelligentsia by the Soviet Union’s People’s Commissariat for Internal
Affairs (Narodnyy Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, the NKVD hereafter) that took place
throughout remote sites in the Soviet Union during the early months of the Second World War.
The series of mass executions that took place from March to June 1940 are collectively known

Danielle Drozdzewski, “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,”
in The Politics of Hiding, Invisibility, and Silence: Between Absence and Presence. New York and Abingdon,
Oxon.: Routledge. 2015, 47.
4
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under the name of the first discovered site of the executions: the Katyń Forest near Smolensk,
Russia.5 In April 1943, German forces discovered the mass graves of over four thousand missing
Polish soldiers, army officers, policemen, and intelligentsia members. Through a communique
issued on Radio Berlin, German forces alerted the world that the mass graves were discovered in
the Katyń Forest and those responsible for the executions were Soviet forces. Following the
announcement of the discovery of these mass graves near Smolensk, Katyń became much more
than the name for the mass executions of thousands of Polish soldiers, police officers, and
members of the intelligentsia. From the discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest, Katyń
has been shrouded in contentions, secrecy, and processes of attempts to unveil the historical truth
of the perpetrators. Often, attempts to unveil the identity of the perpetrators have been influenced
by the political and social environments of the historical actors.

Nearly immediately following the Radio Berlin communique, the Soviet government
issued their own communique, in which the Soviet government blamed German forces for the
crime. The Soviet communique would become the basis for the Soviet state’s official narrative
surrounding the Katyń crime, maintaining the five decade long account that German forces were
behind the mass executions of the Polish officers. The Soviet government’s narrative
surrounding Katyń would later become collectively referred to as the “Katyń lie (kłamstwo
katyńskie),” by Poles living abroad and in the PRL.
What was the “truth” about Katyń? Scholar Andrzej Przewoźnik notes that from the
immediate commencement of the mass executions, the crimes were shrouded in deception and

5

Allen Paul. Stalin’s Massacre and the Triumph of Truth. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2010,

ix.
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secrecy fostering great anxiety throughout segments of Polish society.6 For nearly five decades,
many scholars of Katyń argue that the “truth” remained hidden.7 While this claim is not entirely
incorrect as the state sponsored versions of the truth of the crime’s perpetrators appeared
“hidden,” this school of thought is disingenuous and problematic in its approach in examining
contemporaries’ understanding and perceptions of Katyń throughout the latter portion of the
twentieth century. Contemporaries, like Polish Military General Władysław Anders, knew that
the mass graves found in the Katyń Forest included the missing officers taken prisoner by Soviet
forces from the Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov internment camps in the Soviet Union
following the Radio Berlin announcement, in which German forces alerted the world about the
discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest in 1943.

Utilizing approaches similar to Holocaust scholar and historian Daniel H. Magilow and
Lisa Silverman respectively, I argue that to better understand what Katyń was and has been, we
must examine the representations of Katyń from the discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń
Forest in 1943 to the release of Katyń documents by the Soviet Union in 1990.8 International
representations and debates about Katyń have contributed to how present day scholars
understand Katyń. Much of what we now know about Katyń has also been from representations

Andrzej Przewoźnik, “The Process of Revealing the Truth and Commemorating the Victims,” in White
Spots. Black Spots. Difficult Matters in Polish-Russian Relations, 1918-2008. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press. 2015, 211.
6

For reference, please see works such as Allen Paul’s Katyń: The Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre.
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991; Katyń: Stalin’s Massacre and the
Triumph of Truth. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press. 2010; and George Sanford’s Katyń and the Soviet
Massacre of 1940. New York: Routledge. 2005.
7

8

Daniel H Magilow and Lisa Silverman. Holocaust Representations in History: An Introduction. New
York and London: Bloomsbury Academic. 2015, 1.
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made by Polish émigrés and Poles living within the PRL. Like many contested, complex
historical events, the interpretation of Katyń has never been a “straightforward endeavor.”9 By
showing the development and process of “truth telling” and memory, we gain invaluable insight
into the evolved understandings of Katyń by contemporaries from the midst of the Second World
War to the release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992.
Between the German and Soviet governments, Katyń became a political bargaining tool
of propaganda against the perceived enemy during the Second World War and the immediate
post-war period. Immediately following the discovery of the mass graves near Smolensk, the
German and Soviet governments blamed one another for the crime through a series of
communique. For the Allied governments of the United States and Great Britain, Katyń became
an extremely contentious topic to reckon with (and ultimately avoid) in consideration of the
advancing war effort in which continued Soviet involvement was key. For ordinary Poles living
in Poland and for Polish émigrés across the globe, Katyń symbolized a myriad of meanings from
the Nazi “discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest in April 1943 to a symbol of protest
prior to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For
nearly five decades, the identity of those who executed the Polish officers and the memory of the
mass executions have been hotly contested among governments, scholars, and ordinary citizens
alike.

I use the term “straightforward endeavor” as a borrowed term from Daniel H Magilow and Lisa
Silverman’s analysis of contested, complex historical events, like the Holocaust, in their work Holocaust
Representations in History: An Introduction. New York and London: Bloomsbury Academic. 2015, 1.
9

5

Following that announcement, the Polish government-in-exile would not accept at face
value the Soviet government’s claim that German forces were the perpetrators of the crime,
particularly due to evidence compiled and confirmed by a Soviet representative within the
USSR. Requests for an independent investigation by the Polish government-in-exile eventually
led to the severing of diplomatic relations between the Soviet government and the Polish
government-in-exile by Soviet premiere Josef Stalin in 1943. To understand the processes and
remaking of truth in relation to Katyń is to understand the driving question of contemporaries’
understanding and perceptions of Katyń: who murdered the Polish officers and when the mass
executions take place? This question remained a dominant inquiry of study by scholars of Katyń
until the Solidarity period in the late 1970s to early 1980s. In 1990, Soviet premiere Mikhail
Gorbachev released Soviet documents related to Katyń that confirmed what scholars of Katyń
had already posited: the perpetrators of the crime were not the German forces, but rather the
NKVD. In 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin released further documentation to Polish
President Lech Wałęsa that showed Josef Stalin ordered the crime himself.
Since the release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992, historical truth and the
reconstruction of the mass executions have been the primary objectives of contributions to the
English language historiography of Katyń. There have been few contributions to the English
language historiography and broader scholarship on Katyń examining the collective memory,
representations of the massacres, and contemporaries’ emotions surrounding the series of mass
executions which took place between March and June 1940.10 One such contribution,

In the English language historiography on Katyń, there are publications like the subsequently referenced
work Remembering Katyń. In the broader English language scholarship on Katyń, there are publications, such as
Danielle Drozdzewski’s “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,” in The
Politics of Hiding, Invisibility, and Silence: Between Absence and Presence. New York and Abingdon, Oxon.:
10
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Remembering Katyn, examines the collective memory of the mass executions of over 20,000
Polish soldiers through an interconnected memory culture throughout Belarus, Poland, Russia,
Ukraine, and the Baltic States.11 The contribution is a collaborative collection of essays by noted
Slavic Studies scholars Alexander Etkind, Rory Finnin, Uilleam Blacker, Julie Fedor, Simon
Lewis, Maria Mälksoo, and Matilda Mroz.
In the first chapter of that work, the authors examine representations of Katyń in
Poland.12 The authors identify two important categorizations of localities of people in the making
of the memory and mourning of Katyń: in “Polonia,” the Polish émigré community across the
world, particularly in the United States and Great Britain, and Polish citizens living within the
PRL.13 The authors argue that Poles, both in the PRL and abroad, shared a common goal: the
discovery and disclosure of facts surrounding the Katyń massacre’s perpetrators. There are many
strengths to the authors’ chapter examining Katyń in Poland, particularly their examination of the
representations of mourning of the Katyń victims in Warsaw’s Powązkowski Military Cemetery.
This site became an important and contentious one in the battle for memorialization and

Routledge. 2015; Urszula Jarecka’s examination of rhetorical strategies used in present-day discourses on Katyń in
““Wounded Memory: Rhetorical Strategies Used in Public Discourse on the Katyń Massacre,” in The Long
Aftermath: Cultural Legacies of Europe at War, 1936-2016. New York: Berghahn Books. 2016.; and Maria
Kobielski’s “Endless aftershock. The Katyń Massacre in Contemporary Polish Culture,” in Traumatic Memories of
the Second World War and After. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 197-219. In the broader Polish
language scholarship on collective memory and the Second World War, there are two significant contributions to the
scholarship examining the collective memory of the Second World War in Polish. Please see Lech Nijakowski’s
Polskie Polityki pamięci. Esej socjologiczny (Warszawa: WAiP, 2008) and Adam Ostolski’s Trauma i pamięci
publiczna. Spuścizna II wojny światowej w pamięci zbiorowej współczesnej Polski (unpublished manuscript of
doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 2011).
11

Alexander Etkind, Rory Finnin, et al. Remembering Katyn. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2012, 2.
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Etkind, Finnin, et al. Remembering Katyn, 13.

13

Etkind, Finnin, et al. Remembering Katyn, 14.
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commemoration between the Soviet aligned government and ordinary Polish citizens over the
Katyń victims during the near five-decade long existence of the PRL.

Remembering Katyn is an important contribution, but it is not without its shortcomings.
Although the authors correctly identify some of the most important contributions made to the reremembering and representations of Katyń completed by Polish émigrés in “Polonia” and Poles
living within the PRL, the work does not successfully incorporate other important attributes and
processes of the collective memory making of Katyń in Poland. While the Soviet government
and its state aligned governments did propagate the “Katyń lie,” the Katyn lie was an important
component of the collective memory making processes of Katyń. Furthermore, there remain
critical pieces of the Katyń story that are not explored in contributions to the historiography, like
Remembering Katyn: the influence of various German states on the collective memory making
processes of Katyń. Early representations of Katyń and the reactionary push for historical truth
surrounding the mass executions was heavily influenced by the propaganda campaign conducted
by Nazi Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, and the quest for absolution by the
government of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG hereafter).
The memory making processes of Katyń are a significant intersection of German, Polish, and
Soviet histories. In a final note on Remembering Katyn, the authors examine literary case studies
in their section examining representations of Katyn to demonstrate that the struggle to “know”
Katyń has led way to an understanding of Katyń in Polish literature following the release of the
Katyń documents.

As noted, this examination is problematic in its examinations of early representations of
Katyń. The representations of Katyń made by contemporaries, primarily Polish émigrés and
8

ordinary Poles living within the PRL, were symbols of their understanding of Katyn. By
examining select publications and representations made by Polish émigrés and Poles living
within the PRL, we can better understand how contemporaries interpreted and constructed their
histories of Katyń within their specific cultural and historical context. This study seeks to
expand upon contributions like Remembering Katyn in an attempt to provide a better
understanding of the process and meaning of truth in relation to Katyń as understood by
historical actors during their time and the collective memory makings of the event through
literary and memorial representations.

Explanation of Methodology
By way of introduction, it is important to note that while the term “collective memory,”
appeared in the lexicon of the humanities very early in the twentieth century, the term did not
gain its greater, current significance to the historiography until the mid-twentieth century.14
French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs expanded upon the notion of collective memory within
his groundbreaking, systematic study, On Collective Memory.15 Halbwachs identifies memory as
a socially informed and constructed notion.16 The construction of memory does not depend on
the individual; rather, the construction of memory depends on the collective, such as society,

14

Note: Selections of this portion of the thesis project appeared in two unpublished graduate seminar
papers by the author: Unpublished seminar paper, Amanda Nicole Alarcon, “Review: On Collective Memory,”
History 593, 10 June 2017 and Unpublished seminar paper, Amanda Nicole Alarcon, “The Discourses on National
Suffering: the Intersections of Death, Identity, and Collective Memory during the Twentieth Century.” History 532.
04 December 2017.
Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” The American
Historical Review, Volume 102, Issue 5, 1 December 1997, pp. 1392.
15

16

Maurice Halbwachs. On Collective Memory. Lewis A. Coser, trans. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 1992.

9

family, and other groups. The importance of collective memory as a category of analysis in
historical studies cannot be understated. Following the “memory boom” of the 1990s and 2000s,
the examination of collective memory had provided scholars with a greater understanding of the
ways in which society and the state represent their collective, national pasts and sought to
construct a shared identity from this collective memory.

In addition to paying special attention to collective memory making, this project will also
analyze emotions surrounding the event and notable representations of Katyń. The history of
emotions has rapidly become a topic for historians. The history of emotions is understood as the
historical inquiry of emotions within the broader examination and context of a culture. Though
scholars and historians have been interested in the history of emotions across various disciplines,
history of emotions as a genre has not been widely employed within the study of Polish history.
Throughout the memory making processes and the processes of the events surrounding Katyń,
emotions played a significant role. Distinguished modern German historian Alon Confino notes
the great utility to studying the history of emotions within historical studies of modern German
history. Confino asserts that:
“Emotions, like memories, are absolutely individual; social groups cannot feel or remember, much as they
cannot eat or dance. And yet, one’s emotions, like one’s memory and most intimate dreams, originate
from the symbols, landscape, practices and language that are shared by a given society…..the history of
emotions may be most usefully practiced within a larger history of sensibilities….such a history of
sensibilities would explore emotions such as fear, love and pleasure, but also memory, sacrifice, suicide
or killing, which are not emotions but make little historical sense if isolated from them.”17

Alon Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” The American
Historical Review, Volume 102, Issue 5, 1 December 1997, pp. 1392
17

10

In the third and fourth chapters of this project, I will examine the contributions made to
the historical understanding of Katyń by Polish émigrés and Poles living within the PRL during
the period from the Second World War to the release of the Katyń documents by Soviet premiere
Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990 and Russian president Boris Yeltsin in 1992, as representations of
Katyń. “Representations” is the umbrella term for literary writings, photographs, documents,
memorials, art, testimonies, and “other symbolic usages” of a historical event.18 They were
created either during or following the historical event. In the case of Katyń, representations have
been exclusively created following the mass executions that took place from March-June 1940,
with the exception of Soviet state documents and materials and possessions found on the Polish
victims of the NKVD mass executions. In Jay Winter’s essay “Historical Remembrance in the
Twenty-First Century,” Winter notes that: “both the act of producing history and the act of
remembrance are gestures toward finding meaning in the past.”19 Winter encourages historians to
examine the creative space between history and memory. He later concludes his essay by stating:
“Writing the history of the contemporary world is an act of historical remembrance.”20 In Katyn
and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory, George Sanford notes that
historical truth tends to be “narrativized by an author’s subjectivity and the historical context,”
thus concluding that there are no ‘real’ or ‘true’ stories.21 Throughout the existence of the PRL
and “Polonia,” Polish émigrés, writers, historians, and members of Polish society made

18

Magilow and Silverman. Holocaust Representations in History: An Introduction, 1.

19

Jay Winter. "Foreword: Historical Remembrance in the Twenty-First Century." The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 617 (2008): 6. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098009.
20

Winter. "Foreword: Historical Remembrance in the Twenty-First Century," 12.

21

Sanford. Katyń and the Soviet Massacre of 1940: Truth, Justice and Memory., 157.
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intentional efforts to document their perceptions of the truth and understanding in the history
surrounding Katyń. Their contributions served as acts of historical remembrance, thus helping
shape the collective memory of what we know “Katyń” to be today.

This project will not examine the mass executions of the murdered 22,000 Polish
soldiers, officers, police officers, and members of the intelligentsia themselves. Although the
release of the Katyń documents by the Soviet Union in 1990 provided scholars and historians
state evidence for the crimes and documentation of the logistics of the mass executions, many
contemporary histories still rely on the earlier contributions, primarily made by Polish émigrés,
to construct their histories of Katyń. This project will examine selected representations of Katyń
and the language implemented to describe the mass executions. At “each stage” of the narrative
and representations of Katyń, the politics of memory have played an influential role in the
control, contest, and release of information surrounding the mass executions.22
The following chapter will examine selected representations of Katyń from Reich
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels’s Katyn propaganda campaign, the subsequent response
from the Soviet government over the “discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest, and
Goebbels’ propaganda campaign’s effects on the Polish community, both abroad and in Poland.
As noted, chapter three will examine selected, significant representations of Katyń made by
Polish émigrés. The fourth chapter of this project will examine representations made by Poles
living within the PRL. The fifth and concluding chapter will discuss Katyń, its representations,
and collective meaning from the early 1990s to 2010 in the present-day Republic of Poland.

22

Drozdzewski, “Knowing (or Not) about Katyń: The Silencing and Surfacing of Public Memory,” 49.

12

A final important note about this study: a study of this magnitude cannot and will not
examine every recorded representation of Katyń from the Second World War to present-day.
Rather, I will examine selected representations of Katyń that have made a significant impact on
the continued understandings of the mass executions. Through this methodology, I hope to
elucidate upon the importance of perception, contingency, emotion, representations, and the
complexities of memory in the historical makings and understandings of Katyń.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE “DISCOVERY” OF KATYŃ IN 1943

In a diary entry dated April 9, 1943, Reich Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels
noted the “discovery” of the mass graves of murdered Polish soldiers, civilians, and various
members of the intelligentsia by German forces in the Katyń Forest near Smolensk in the
Western portion of the Soviet Union:23
“Polish mass graves have been found near Smolensk. The Bolsheviks simply shot
down and then shoveled into mass graves some 10,000 Polish prisoners, among
them civilian captives, bishops, intellectuals, artists, et cetera. . . .Gruesome
aberrations of the human soul were thus revealed. I saw to it that the Polish mass
graves be inspected by neutral journalists from Berlin. I also had Polish
intellectuals taken there. They are to see for themselves what is in store for them
should their wish that the Germans be defeated by the Bolsheviks actually be
fulfilled.”24

To better understand the importance of the discovery of the mass graves in the Katyń
Forest in subsequent representations by Polish émigrés and Polies living in the PRL, it is
important to problematize the notion of “discovery” and the ensuing propaganda campaign
launched by Goebbels. While Goebbels first notes the “discovery” of the graves on April 9,
1943 in his diary entries, several scholars believe that high ranking German officials learned
about the mass graves as early as winter 1941 into spring 1942.25 Following the invasion of the

23

Joseph Goebbels. The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943. Trans. Louis P. Lochner. New York: Doubleday &
Company, Inc. 1948, 318.
24

Goebbels. The Goebbels Diaries: 1942-1943, 318.

25

See George Sanford and Anna Cienciala, et al.
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Soviet Union by Germany during Operation Barbarossa in 1941, the territory surrounding the
Katyń Forest was under the occupation and control of German forces by late July 1941.26 In
November 1941, Colonel Friedrich Ahrens arrived in Smolensk to command the military
regimen.
Following the Colonel’s arrival, villagers recounted rumors to the occupying German
forces about the Katyń Forest being utilized as an execution site of political opponents by the
Bolsheviks.27 During the summer of 1942, Polish workers in a German forced labor battalion
were told rumors from villagers that Soviet officials had murdered “their Polish countrymen” in
the Katyń forest.28 A villager from the surrounding area, Ivan Kisselev, took the unknown
Polish workers to the site where he thought the bodies of the Polish soldiers were buried.
Kisselev found the site and the Polish workers commemorated the site with a wooden cross,
though they did not report their discoveries to the German occupying forces.29

During the early winter of 1943, Colonel Ahrens tracked a wolf through the woods and
came across the wooden cross on top of an excavated mound. Following an investigation and
brief excavation, the body of a Polish officer was revealed.30 Colonel Ahrens reported the
discovery to the Army Group Center in late February 1943. The Army Group Center dispatched

26
Kenneth F. Ledford, “Mass Murderers Discover Mass Murder: The Germans and Katyn, 1943,” Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law. Vol. 44: no. 3 (2012): pp.583.
27

Paul. Katyn: the Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, 203.

28

Paul. Katyn: the Untold Story of Stalin’s Polish Massacre, 203.
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Professor Dr. Gerhard Buhtz, a forensic pathologist affiliated with the University of Breslau and
the medical staff of the Army Group, to investigate. The exhumation and autopsy of the remains
did not take place until March 29th, due to the hard freeze on the ground.31 During the initial
excavations, nearly eleven mass graves were exhumed.32 These mass graves contained nearly
3,000 murdered Polish soldiers, officers, and various members of the intelligentsia. In historian
Kenneth F. Ledford’s essay examining the use of Katyń in Reich propaganda, Ledford notes
that Joseph Goebbels had likely first gained knowledge of the mass graves of Polish prisoners
near Smolensk on April 1st or 2nd, 1943.33
The “discovery” of the mass graves came at an opportune time for propaganda purposes
as perceived by Goebbels, in relation to the war effort for the Nazi regime. Following the
military defeat of Stalingrad by German forces in early 1943, Goebbels saw the mass graves as a
prime opportunity to create tensions between Western Allies, like Great Britain and the United
States, and the Soviet Union. With the exploitation of the discovery of the mass graves near
Smolensk, Goebbels sought to address three audiences through the Katyń propaganda campaign:
1). the Poles living in the General-Government in hopes of mobilizing Poles against the
impending Soviet army invasion, 2). the Western Allies in an effort to sow “dissension” between
them and the Soviet government, and 3). the German people, to steel them for an “increased
defensive effort by instilling in them fear of the consequences of a Soviet victory.”34 The
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discovery of the mass graves and the subsequent exhumations presented a problem for Goebbels,
as a percentage of the executed officers were found to be Polish Jews. In addition to this issue,
German forces committed atrocities against Polish members of the intelligentsia and leaders as
the Soviets had done during the invasion of Poland in September 1939.35

Before announcing the discovery of the mass graves to a global audience, Goebbels
arranged for a delegation of Polish leaders to fly from Warsaw, Kraków, and Lublin to Smolensk
on April 10th. 36 On April 11th, the public propaganda campaign began through an address on the
German news agency Trans-Ocean, though the effort would not gain global traction until April
13th. On April 13th, 1943, Radio Berlin broadcasted an announcement that reports had reached
Berlin from Smolensk, where German forces discovered the mass graves of thousands of Polish
officers murdered by Soviet forces:
“It is reported from Smolensk that the local inhabitants have indicated to the
German authorities a place in which mass executions had been carried out by the
Bolsheviks and where 10,000 Polish officers had been murdered by the
GPU….the total number of Polish officers corpses amounts to 10,000, which
would correspond more or less to the entire Polish officer corps captured and
taken prisoner by the Bolsheviks.”37,38
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Within the Radio Berlin announcement, German officials correctly posited that the
murdered Polish officers were transported from the Kozelsk camp to the Katyń Forest near
Smolensk. In following representations by the German Nazi government, the numbers increased
to 11,000 to 12,000 murdered Polish officers.39 The fluctuating numbers utilized during the
commencement of the propaganda campaign are vitally important in understanding subsequent
representations of the mass executions made by the Polish government-in-exile, Polish émigrés,
and Polish citizens living within Poland.

Following the Radio Berlin announcement, the Soviet government responded to the
accusations put forth by German officials in a communique titled “Vile Acquisitions by the
German-Fascist Murders” from Moscow on April 15th, 1943. Within the communique, Radio
Moscow broadcasted a counter-attack to the Radio Berlin broadcast:
“In the past two or three days Goebbels’ slanderers have been spreading vile
fabrications alleging that the Soviet authorities carried out a mass shooting of
Polish officers in the Spring of 1940, in the Smolensk area. In launching this
monstrous investigation the German-Fascist scoundrels did not hesitate to spread
the most unscrupulous and base lies, in their attempts to cover up the crimes
which, as has now become evident, were perpetrated themselves. The GermanFascist report on this subject leave no doubt as to the tragic fate of the former
Polish prisoners-of-war in 1941 were engaged in construction work in areas west
of the Smolensk region and who fell into the hands of German-Fascist hangmen
in the summer of 1941, after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the
Smolensk area……”40
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The initial reaction to the Radio Berlin announcement was one of diffidence by Poles
residing in London.41 The announcement had a more immense, immediate effect upon the Polish
government-in-exile residing in London, as it launched them into a precarious situation between
the Western allies and the Soviet government. As noted in the previous chapter, both German
and Polish forces had rounded up members of the Polish intelligentsia and military and
perpetrated violent atrocities against Polish people during the September campaign in 1939. The
Polish government set out on April 15th in search of “what they regarded as the definite facts,” in
reports confirmed by sources in the USSR about the missing Polish POWs.42 The results of the
report presented more difficulties for the Polish government-in-exile in regards to their relations
with the Soviet government. While the government could not confirm that 10,000 Polish officers
had been murdered by the Soviets in the Katyń Forest as reported by Radio Berlin at the time,
the report showed that over 15,000 Polish officers had been held in Kozelsk (approximately
5,000), Starobelsk (3920), and Ostashkov (6,570) as prisoners of war by the Soviets.43 The ones
from Kozelsk were transported towards Smolensk by Soviet forces in 1940. While there was no
debate that the Polish officers were executed, there was a contest between the German and Soviet
governments on who perpetrated the mass executions. The answer lay in finding out the date of
the mass executions, which would require forensic investigation and analysis.
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After an analysis of this report, the Polish government-in-exile could not accept at face
value the Soviet assertion that the Germans had committed the atrocities in the Katyń Forest.44
Calls for an independent, impartial investigation were soon issued by the Polish government. On
April 16th, the Polish War Minister Lieutenant Gen. Marian Kukiel requested an impartial
investigation by a Red Cross commission “on the spot” to understand who murdered the 15,000
missing POWs and why they appeared to “simply” disappear.45 Simultaneously, the German
government requested an impartial investigation of the mass graves found in the Katyń Forest
near Smolensk. The Polish request for an independent investigation led to the Soviet Minister of
Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov arguing that the Poles had used “the slanderous Hitlerite fake” as an
attempt to regain the contested Borderlands of Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania.46 Eventually, the
issue would lead to the severing of diplomatic ties by Josef Stalin between the Soviet
government and the Polish government-in-exile on April 25, 1943.

Following the Radio Berlin broadcast, Goebbels continued a press campaign to vilify the
Soviets and deepen a rhetorical motif of equating Bolshevism and Jews through representations
of the mass executions of the Polish officers. Through works published during the press
campaign, “Katyń” first entered the lexicon of the crime to symbolize the mass graves found in
the Katyń Forest to Poles living within German occupied Poland. In Kraków, lists of the
murdered Polish officers were published in the Polish language, Nazi propaganda newspaper
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Goniec Krakowski (The Kraków Messenger). On April 15th, 1943, the newspaper first published
the “discovery” of the mass graves found near the Katyń Forest in Smolensk.47 On April 17,
1943, photographs of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest were published in the newspaper with
the headline, “Wrażenia krakowskiego robotnika w lesie pod Katyniem (Impression of a Kraków
worker in the forest near Katyń).” 48 In the April 20, 1943 issue of Goniec Krakowski, a “new list
of the names of the identified Polish officers’ bodies,” appeared in the paper.49 In subsequent
issues of the newspaper, names of the executed Polish officers would continue to be published
with identifiable information about the deceased officers such as rank or documents found on the
bodies.50 In addition to the list of names published by the German backed Goniec Krakowski, the
underground Polish resistance movement, Armia Krajowa (Home Army, AK hereafter),
published the growing list of those identified in the Katyń Forest in underground publications
during this time. The names of the identified bodies were also announced in the streets of
Kraków during the campaign. The news would cause “nationwide indignation and sorrow,” as it
was received across occupied Poland.51 The list of names came to be collectively known as “lista
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katyńska (the Katyń List),” as a result of the lists’ publications in newspapers like Goniec
Krakowski throughout Poland.

Within Germany, the propaganda campaign took the form of print and documentaries to
further capitalize upon growing fears of Bolshevism. In the Nazi newspaper Völkischer
Beobachter (Völkischer Observer) articles were published equating the perceived violence and
threat of Bolshevism with Jews, such as “The Mass Murder of Katyn: The Work of Jewish
Butchers,” and “Judah’s Blood Guilt Grows to Unfathomable.”52 Nazi officials extensively
documented the exhumation and autopsy of the murdered Polish officers in the Katyń Forest
through photographs, newsreels, and video footage throughout the month of April until their
investigation was “interrupted by the heat” in June 1943. Scholar George Sanford posits that the
approaching Soviet army likely interrupted the conclusion of the investigation.53 This
documentary footage was incorporated into the widely received film, Im Wald von Katyn (In the
Forest of Katyń).54 Within the film, the narrator guides the audience through a narrative
reconstruction of the mass executions and the exhumation and autopsy processes. Throughout
the film, the narrator condemns the Bolsheviks for the murders, switching between footage of
selected recovered personal belongings of the murdered officers and the footage of the
decomposed bodies of the Polish officers.55 In fall 1943, the German Foreign Office published a
massive collection of documents, photographs, and the list of the murdered officers’ names
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under the titles, Amtliches Material zum Massenmord von Katyn (Official Material on the Mass
Murder of Katyń) and Der Massenmord im Walde von Katyn: Ein Tatsachenbericht auf Grund
Amtlicher Unterlagen (The Mass Murder in the Forest of Katyń: A Factual Account on the Basis
of Official Documents).56 The Katyń propaganda campaign soon came to an end in September
1943. Goebbels noted in a diary entry dated September 29, 1943:
“Unfortunately we have had to give up Katyn. The Bolsheviks undoubtedly will
soon “find” that we shot the 12,000 Polish officers. That episode is one that is
going to cause us quite a little trouble in the future. The Soviets are undoubtedly
going to make it their business to discover as many mass graves as possible and
then blame them on us.”57

In the immediate aftermath of the Nazi propaganda campaign, it appeared evident that the
campaign failed to achieve all of the objectives put forth by Goebbels. Though the campaign
placed the Polish government-in-exile in a precarious situation with the Soviet government and
diplomatic ties were severed between the two countries’ governments, the Western Allies (Great
Britain and the United States) remained relatively silent about the question of Katyń during the
Second World War and throughout the Cold War period. In 1943, the American and British
governments came to the conclusion that the Soviet Union was guilty of the mass executions of
the Polish officers in the Katyń Forest, however the governments suppressed the “actual truth” of
the executions in an effort to maintain their alliance with the Soviet Union for the war effort.58
Though the German Nazi propaganda campaign also failed to mobilize Poles into a joint defense
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with Nazi Germany in the General Government, the campaign had a lasting legacy on the ways
in which Polish émigrés wrote and conceptualized the mass executions of Polish officers and
soldiers in the Katyń Forest.

In late 1943, the Soviet Union established a Special Commission under the direction of
Nikolai Burdenko, to establish their “truth” about the Katyń crime.59 The Commission would
come to be known as the Burdenko Commission. As soon as the Soviet army took control of the
Smolensk area, the Special Commission and investigation team were ready to begin their
forensic analysis campaign of the mass graves located in the Katyń Forest. The “investigation”
lasted less than a month, supported by the Soviet state’s forensic-pathological forces, police, and
other resources needed to conduct the investigation. The brief of the Special Commission tasked
the force to “confirm” the “Circumstances of the Shooting of Polish Officer Prisoners by the
German-Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest.”60 The Soviet medical-forensic team “confirmed”
that German forces were the ones that killed the Polish officers “between July and September
1941,” following the German occupation of the Smolensk area in July 1941.61 Throughout the
report, there were several witnesses that were also interviewed in the German report on Katyń
that “changed” their testimony surrounding the mass executions of the Polish officers. The
witnesses quoted in the Soviet report that their testimony surrounding the Soviet perpetration of
the executions in the German report on Katyń was coerced by Gestapo beatings and threats.62
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George Sanford posits that this change in testimony is not surprising, as the witnesses were
villagers living in the surrounding Smolensk area, which was now under the control of the Soviet
government.63 The report was endorsed by Burdenko in early January 1944. The report became
the basis for the Soviet state representation of the perpetrators behind the mass executions of the
Polish officers and by extension, the state sponsored history that was told to the outside world
until 1990.64 This representation would be challenged extensively from the end of the Second
World War in Europe to the collapse of communism by Polish émigrés living within the United
States and Britain and ordinary Poles living within the PRL. The next chapter will explore
selected representations from Polish émigrés in light of the International Military Tribunal trials
in Nuremberg in the aftermath of the Second World War.
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CHAPTER THREE: REPRESENTATIONS OF KATYŃ BY POLISH
ÉMIGRÉS

Introduction: A Note about “Polonia:” Polish Émigrés and the “Polish
Diaspora”
Prior to the outbreak of the Second World War, nearly twelve million Poles emigrated to
countries across the world. Within these countries, Polish émigrés often created diasporic
communities with nationalistic, constructed elements. These diasporic communities would often
refer to themselves as “Polonia,” a contested and constructed symbol of Polish émigrés’
collective identity that was intimately tied to their homeland, Poland.65 The Encyclopedia of
Diaspora defines the term “diaspora” to refer to the resettled communities of those forcibly
dispersed from their homelands, such as Jews and Armenians, who held a strong identification
“with their homelands and distinct groups identities through community boundaries shaped by
hostile responses in places of settlement.”66 As these diasporic groups created their distinctive
community identities in their respective places of settlement, negotiations of character and
identity of the community occurred.
The “Polish diaspora,” posited by scholar Jolanta A. Drzewiecka, holds its historic roots
in the “struggle” for an independent Polish state throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, and the post Second World War period. 67 The contributing factors to the Polish
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diaspora are varied. Following the partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end
of the eighteenth century, the first diasporic communities began to appear across the world.
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, revolutions, economic disparities, and war
produced Polish diasporic communities throughout Europe, Latin America, and the United
States.

As noted, diasporic communities often embark on careful self-negotiations of what
constitutes the character and identity of their respective diasporic community. Throughout the
existences of the various, Polish diasporic communities across the world, these negotiations have
taken place and the character of the community has transformed over time. These negotiations
have often encompassed ethnic and religious considerations. Throughout the modern period,
many different peoples and ethnic groups have existed in Polish lands, such as non-Jewish Poles,
Jewish Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Germans, and many
others.68 Within the Polish diaspora, Polish Jews were presented as “an issue” to diasporic
consciousness during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.69 Although Polish Jews have lived
for centuries in Polish lands and interacted with non-Jewish Poles consistently, most Poles
considered Jewish Poles to be a “separate ethnic group,” thus not belonging to the Polish
diasporic communities.70 Within the United States and other Polish diasporic communities,
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instances of antisemitism would occur against Jewish Poles throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.71 Catholic Poles primarily constituted the Polish diasporic communities.

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the largest Polish emigration
occurred to the United States.72 While the vast majority of Polish émigrés migrated to the United
States for economic reasons prior to the Second World War, a diasporic consciousness was
evident among the Polish-American community.73 Polish immigrants considered themselves as
the “American Polonia.” Polish immigrants considered “American Polonia” as a fourth partition
of Poland during the nineteenth century.74 Within the United States, Polish émigré communities
held deep sentiment of victimization and exile due to “foreign oppression” and political
suppression following the partitions of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century.75

The Second World War marked a decisive turning point for Poles both living inside and
outside of the country. The term “Polonia” came to especially symbolize the Polish émigrés
living outside of Poland during the outbreak of the Second World War, the war years, and the
post-war period. Nearly 3,000 Polish civilians fled to London alone at the outbreak of the Second
World War. Following the defeat of France in 1940, Poles living throughout the United Kingdom
organized themselves into military units and communities. In London, the Polish government
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reconstituted itself in exile under General Władysław Sikorski. The Polish government-in-exile
primarily employed Polish civilians living in London.76 The government-in-exile maintained
residence in London throughout the war and the post-war period.

The Second World War left a decisive impact on the character of the Polish diaspora. In
1945, nearly six million Poles remained outside of Polish national borders.77 Following the Yalta
Conference in February 1945 in which Poland was perceived to have been relegated to the
“Soviet sphere of influence,” hundreds of thousands of Poles were faced with the choice to return
to Poland or stay abroad.78 While many Poles returned to Poland, there were substantial numbers
of Poles that stayed in refugee camps, displaced persons camps, or in-exile communities that
were established during the war, like the community in London. Many Poles settled in the United
States, Britain, and throughout the former British Commonwealth in countries like Canada and
Australia.79 Poles also settled in countries throughout Europe and Latin America.
Depending upon the respective countries of Polish diasporic communities’ settlement, the
character of the Polish diasporic communities decidedly took on an anti-communist viewpoint in
many countries across the world. Within these post-war, anti-communist diasporic communities,
Polish Jews were largely absent from Polonia organizations and the community. Within the
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United States, many Polonia organizations largely identified themselves as Catholic
organizations and they were often anti-Jewish in practice.80 It is important to note that this
exclusion did not occur due to the population size of Polish Jews living within the United States,
as many Polish Jews had immigrated to the United States following the Holocaust and antiSemitic purges of Jews by the Polish Communist government in the 1950s and 1960s.81 Outside
of the “Polonia” communities of the United States, these anti-Jewish sentiments occurred in
communities in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Austria, Denmark, and many other countries.82

Although members of the diasporic communities no longer remained in Polish national
borders, issues pertinent to Poland, like Katyń, remained an integral part of the Polish émigré
community. Cited as one of the few issues in which the wider Polish émigré community could
unite over, significant contributions were made to establishing the “truth” and history
surrounding Katyń by Polish émigrés following the end of the Second World War. These
contributions were made by émigrés living in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia,
and many other countries throughout the world. Throughout this chapter, I will be examining
select contributions made to the understanding of Katyń by Polish émigré in the United States
and Great Britain. As noted, the greatest emigration of Poles occurred to the United States.
Following the end of the Second World War, the “American Polonia” persisted as the leading,
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diasporic community.83 Throughout the Second World War and the post-war period, the
“epicenter” of émigré political activity was London.84 Although the British government ceased to
recognize the Polish government-in-exile as a legitimate, political entity following the Yalta
Conference, the Polish government-in-exile existed in London until 1990. Each year, the Polish
émigré community in London organized memorial events for the Katyń dead.85 In the United
States, members of the United States House of Representatives established a commission to
investigate the “truth” about Katyń in the early 1950s. While the commission was established
during the onset of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, this
commission was also made possible by efforts and protests made within the Polish American
community over the issue of Katyń.86 Polish émigrés’ contributions to the continued
understanding of Katyń made an inconsequential impact to the memory of the crime in Poland,
particularly during the creation and existence of the Soviet aligned government in the PRL:
“Because the people in Poland were forbidden from knowing about these subjects,
the memory of them survived to a great degree because of efforts of the émigré
community….These voices were raised in the West for forty-five years, but after a
while the issue became a great bore. People were horrified when the Russian tanks
crushed the Hungarians in 1956 and rolled into Czechoslovakia in 1968. There
were many demonstrations and it was all heroic, but it soon failed. The West sort
of, in a sense, wrote Eastern Europe off. In that situation, you have to learn to
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tailor protest to the environment you are living in, to keep the embers aglow
without becoming a nuisance. We did that pretty well.”87
Throughout the existence of the PRL, representations, commemorations, and activism
surrounding Katyń was made possible by earlier contributions made by Polish émigré within
Great Britain and the United States.

The International Military Tribunal and the Polish Émigré Community
Following the end of the Second World War in Europe, the Allies settled on establishing
the International Military Tribunal to try German war criminals in Nuremberg. The series of
prosecutions would come to be collectively known as the Nuremberg Trials. The Tribunal was
established to conduct trials and punishments of “the major war criminals of the Axis countries”
and to “have the power to try and punish persons, who acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or members of organizations” that committed crimes
against peace.88 The Tribunal was also tasked with prosecuting individuals for a new category of
crime, “crimes against humanity.”89 This category included assassination, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, ill treatment of prisoners of war, and any other inhuman action
committed against civilians before or after the after the war, as well as persecution on political,
racial, or religious grounds.
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At the outset of the trial, the Tribunal accepted a proposal from the Allied powers,
requesting that the alleged crimes committed by the Allied Powers not be prosecutable during the
series of trials. The acceptance of the proposal protected attacks on the Soviets over the issue of
Katyń from the commencement of the trials. The charges against German Nazi leaders included
the mass execution of the Polish officers found at Katyń. This charge was added against the
advice of British Attorney General Sir Hartley Shawcross.90 On July 1, 1946, the Tribunal heard
its first “evidence” against the German Nazi officials for the mass executions of the Polish
officers found in the Katyń Forest.91 The indictment read: “In September 1941, 11,000 Polish
officers, prisoners of war, were killed in the Katyn woods near Smolensk.”92 The only supporting
document that was submitted for consideration for the Tribunal was the Burdenko Commission
Report, in which the Soviet state found German forces responsible for the crime.93

During the trials, former Nazi officials sought to clear themselves of the Katyń crime.
Following extensive witness interviews, the Katyń case was not listed in the International
Military Tribunal’s final verdicts. In private, the Tribunal decided that the war crimes of Katyń
were not perpetrated by the Germans. Thus, their responsibility for prosecuting Katyń ended, as
the former Nazi government officials were on trial, not the Soviets.94 Following the end of the
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International Military Tribunal, the crime of Katyń was officially recognized as a Nazi crime by
the Soviet government, though in the late 1940s, the event was not to “be recognized at all.”95 As
part of the agreement reached by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at
the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Poland became incorporated into the Soviet Union in the
reconstruction of Europe following the Second World War. The state would become the Polska
Rzeczpospolita Ludowa (the People’s Republic of Poland, PRL hereafter), politically aligned
with the Soviet government. Thus, representations of Katyń made in the PRL by ordinary Poles
were a particularly dangerous and even fatal endeavor. The consequences ranged from legal
punishment and imprisonment to even death.96 This did not stop ordinary Poles from
representing the event, however. This chapter will examine significant Polish émigrés’
contributions to the understanding and memory making processes of Katyń throughout the
various Polish diasporic communities, some of which were eventually smuggled into the PRL.
By doing so, we can better understand how Polish émigrés’ contributions served as a dual project
of history and memory: “writing the history of the contemporary world is an act of historical
remembrance.”97

Selected Representations of Katyń from Polish Émigrés during the Early Cold
War Period

Zbrodnia Katyńska a Świetle Dokumentów, 1948
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Throughout the International Military Tribunal, Poles living in London made several
attempts to present their information to the Tribunal but were denied the opportunity.98 While
the London Poles were denied the opportunity to present their information and evidence to the
International Military Tribunal, this denial did not prevent future attempts made by Polish
émigrés living in the United States and Great Britain from theorizing who the executioners of the
Katyń victims were and when they were murdered. Following the conclusion of the International
Military Tribunal trials in Nuremberg, significant efforts to posit who the perpetrators were and
when the Polish officers had been executed would be made by Polish émigrés living within the
United States and Great Britain. Polish émigrés—particularly those forcibly exiled from
Poland—had already begun conducting research and compiling documentation to understand the
circumstances in which the Polish officers were murdered to posit who murdered the thousands
of officers, soldiers, and other Polish members of the intelligentsia in the Katyń Forest and when
they were executed during the Second World War.

In 1948, one of the most significant émigré contributions to the evolving understanding
of Katyń was published in the Polish language work Zbrodnia Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów
(The Katyń Crime in Light of the Documents). The work holds a further special significance to
this study, as the work first introduced the commonly used present-day Polish phrase “zbrodnia
katyńska (the crime of Katyń)” to the Polish lexicon of words and phrases used to signify and
describe the mass executions of the thousands of Polish officers in the Katyń Forest. It is
important to note that the work did not invent the term. The term “Katyń crime” was first
introduced by the Soviet government in official responses to deny their culpability in the mass
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executions. Zbrodnia Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów was published in London, the “epicenter”
of émigré activity.
At the time of publication, Zbrodnia Katyńska w Świetle Dokumentów was published
without any identifiable author information, with the exception of General Władysław Anders’
foreword and his work on the volume being credited at the time of publication in 1948. Several
people worked on the compilation and analysis of documents in Zbrodnia Katyńska under the
work of one editor.99 In present-day understandings and interpretations of Zbrodnia Katyńska,
we now know the identities of some of the contributors to the work, most importantly the
identity of the editor of the volume: Jósef Mackiewicz. Mackiewicz’ report on the Katyń mass
graves in 1943 caused his involuntary flight from Poland to the West and his name was
“cleansed” from the public sphere as a result.100 One of the few survivors of the NKVD
executions, Stanisław Świaniewicz, also anonymously contributed to the volume.

There is no one figure more well-known in this research perhaps than Polish Military
General Władysław Anders. Born in former Russian Poland, Władysław Anders had a
longstanding military career dating back to the First World War. Anders served in the Russian
Army from 1914 to 1917, the Polish Army from 1918-1925—notably during the Polish-Soviet
War—and was the commander of the Cavalry Operational Group in the Polish army during the
September 1939 campaign. Anders was captured by the Soviet Army in Lwów (Lviv). Anders
was deported to the Soviet Union, where he was imprisoned in the Lubyanka Prison in Moscow
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until August 1941.101 On August 4th, 1941, the Soviets released Anders as part of the newly
formed alliance between the Soviet and Polish governments following the German invasion of
the Soviet Union in June 1941.102 The Polish government-in-exile appointed Anders as the
commander in chief of the military forces in the USSR and the Soviet forces had already
approved the appointment. Anders was tasked with forming military units out of the population
of formerly imprisoned, Polish officers and other military members captured by the Soviets.

Long before the appointment, Anders had learned about the internment camps of
Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov from his cellmate during his imprisonment at Lubyanka.103
In the prison, rumors about thousands of missing Polish officers, soldiers, and others last seen at
these internment camps circulated throughout the prison. Following Anders’ release, the issue of
the missing men became a constant force that informed each of his “endeavors and efforts”
throughout his appointment as commander of the Polish forces in the USSR.104 In a December
3rd meeting between Josef Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov, Polish military leader Władysław
Sikorski, and Anders, the issue of the missing Polish soldiers arose as an immediate topic of
inquiry and concern for the Polish representatives at the meeting. At the beginning of the
encounter, Sikorski declared that important terms of the alliance were not being fulfilled,
particularly the release of the thousands of men held at Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov.
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Arguing that the prisoners were still unaccounted for, Stalin told Sikorski and Anders that the
prisoners simply escaped. Anders immediately asked Stalin:
“Where could they have escaped to?”
“Well, to Manchuria,” Stalin replied.105

Following the reply, Sikorski and Anders argued that it would be impossible for the
thousands of men from the three camps to make it thousands of miles undetected across the vast
expanse of the Soviet Union. Eventually, Stalin told them that the prisoners were freed, but had
not yet arrived to the assembly location for Anders’ army at Buzuluk. Unknown to Sikorski and
Anders at the time of the exchange, the men would never arrive. In subsequent recollections on
the period, Anders would recount the frustration that accompanied his attempts to locate the men
and to find out what had happened to the thousands of men formerly interned in the Kozelsk,
Starobelsk, and Ostashkov camps. More than 8,000 commissioned and thousands of noncommissioned officers were still unaccounted for by Anders throughout his time in the Soviet
Union.106 When Radio Berlin announced the “discovery” of the mass graves to the world and
accompanied a list of the names of the Katyń victims that matched the missing officers from the
camps, Anders could “not have doubts” about what happened to the missing men.107
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In the foreword of Zbrodnia Katyńska, Anders identifies several factors as the motivation
for the study. Of the utmost significance to the work, Anders classifies the compilation and
publication of the study as a reaction to the omission of Katyń in the Nuremberg Trial
verdicts.108 The work seeks to act as an intervention into government representations of the
crime, by giving a “true” account of the affair, which had been shrouded in misinformation and
silence.109 Throughout the work, the Zbrodnia Katyńska contributors provide a historical
background to the capture of the Polish officers, the deportations and mass executions of these
officers, a reconstruction of the events leading up to the discovery of the mass graves in Katyń,
Zbrodnia Katyńska is divided into four sections: before the “disclosure” of the mass graves, the
disclosure of the crime and published documents, additional Polish documentation, and
concluding analysis of who perpetrated the mass executions of the Polish officers found in the
Katyń Forest.110 The work utilizes documents from the German and Soviet governments,
photographs of the mass graves, diaries and other personal documents from the murdered Polish
prisoners, Soviet newspapers from 1940 found on the bodies of the prisoners, and other
documentary evidence on the mass executions. The work concludes with the argument that the
Soviet NKVD was responsible for the crimes committed in the Katyń Forest.
Following the publication of Zbrodnia Katyńska in London, the work was “widely and
repeatedly” circulated in the Polish underground.111 The work became known as the seminal
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bridge between the Polish émigrés outside of the PRL and activists living within the PRL. In the
following chapter of this project, the Powązkowski Cemetery and representations of the Katyń in
the PRL will be explored. In addition to the impact that the publication had on representations of
Katyń in the PRL, the publication had lasting effects on subsequent publications and studies on
Katyń by Polish émigrés across the world, notably in the United States and Great Britain. The
work would be published in an English language edition of the work in 1965 on the twentieth
anniversary of the Nuremberg Trials.112 In 1989, a fifth edition of the work would be published,
just one year before the release of the Katyń documents by Soviet premiere Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Cold War, American Media, and Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest
Massacre, 1962
Until the publication of Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Massacre by J.K.
Zawodny in 1962, Anna Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva, and Wojciech Materski argue that the
American media was relatively silent about Katyń.113 Upon further investigation, this claim does
not withstand scrutiny. Between the “discovery” of the mass graves in 1943 and the publication
of Death in the Forest in 1962, hundreds of articles and letters to the editor were published in the
New York Times on the issue of Katyń alone within the United States. In 1952, over 80 articles
and letters to the editor were published in the wake of the House of Representatives’
investigation on the issue of Katyń in the New York Times.
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Following the “Sovietization” of Eastern Europe and the onset of hostile relations
between the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1940s, a renewed and distinctly
politicized interest in the “truth” about the ‘Katyn Forest Massacre’ was undertaken by members
of the United States government. On September 18th, 1951, the House of Representatives voted
unanimously to “conduct an investigation of the facts, evidence, and circumstances of the Katyn
Forest Massacre.”114 Through this announcement and subsequent explanations, the introduction
of the terms “the Katyn Forest massacre” and “Katyn massacre” appeared in the English
language lexicon to describe the mass executions in the Katyń Forest.

The Select Committee tasked with conducting the investigation were members of the
United States House of Representative that hailed from districts with high numbers of Polish
émigrés and Polish-Americans in their constituencies. The Committee held hearings during the
height of the Korean War, interviewing American and Polish émigrés, members of the
Nuremberg prosecution team, three German officers questioned at Nuremberg such as Colonel
Friedrich Ahrens (the German Colonel who discovered the mass graves in the Katyń Forest), and
Polish figures such as General Władysław Anders.115

In American media outlets like the New York Times, the hearings were extensively
covered throughout the early months of 1952. The coverage of the hearings produced many
visceral reactions among members of American “Polonia,” as well as the Polish Embassy within
the United States. One such editorial “Repercussions of Katyn,” detailed the contention between
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the Polish Embassy and the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, as well as the repercussions of the
congressional hearings. 116 In early March 1952, the Polish Embassy published a press release
that accused the United States of using “poisoned weapons inherited from Goebbels” in its
investigation of Katyń, such as the German documents on the crime.117 In response, Secretary of
State Acheson barred the Polish Embassy from producing further publications on the Katyń
investigation. The editorial’s anonymous author highlights perceptions of Katyń in the political
memory landscape of the war in the United States at the time, as the author notes that Katyń was
the “most grisly incident” of the Second World War.118
Following the editorial’s publication, a series of editorial letters were received in
response to the contents and claims of the March 23rd editorial. In one such editorial titled, “To
Make Katyn Possible,” Nathaniel Kleitman argued that through the “heat of the argument over
which side did the brutal killings—and both regimes were equally mendacious and equally
capable of committing mass murder—one overlooks the original crime perpetrated by the Soviet
Government….slave labor.”119 Within the editorial letter, Kleitman notes that Katyn was only
made possible due to the detainment and forced labor of the Polish prisoners of war by the Soviet
Union. In response to Kleitman’s editorial, former United States Ambassador to Poland, Arthur
Bliss Lane, refuted many of the points made by Kleitman as “errors of fact,” with particular
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emphasis on Kleitman’s argument on forced labor.120 Lane notes that the Polish officers that
were executed were not “detained as slave laborers in the guise of prisoners of war,” but rather
“prisoners even though no declaration of war against Poland had been by the Soviet Union” until
the deportation of the Polish officers by the Soviet Union between the months of “March to May
1940.”121 Lane admonishes the New York Times for publishing such a letter as Kleitman’s
editorial and states “..it is obviously highly important that the American public should not accept
the distorted and completely false information given out by Pravda [the Soviet state media outlet]
after the graves of those murdered men were found in 1943.”122 Lane’s editorial was met with
response from Kleitman, who stated that the dates utilized by Kleitman in his letter to disprove
Kleitman’s forced labor claims, “proved to himself [Lane] that the extermination of the officers
in question was done by the Soviet authorities.”123 Within the editorial, Kleitman notes that “the
public at large does not seem convinced that this occurred…hence the appointment of a
Congressional committee to look into the matter [of Katyń].”124 The exchange of letters between
Arthur Bliss Lane and Nathaniel Kleitman provide an important glimpse into the many debates
that political figures and members of American society had about the issue of Katyń during the
House of Representatives’ investigation. As noted in the previous chapter, Katyń remained a
source of contention between the German and Soviet governments. Within the United States, the
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issue of Katyń also remained a source of contention between the Polish embassy, American
political officials, and American society.
Following the series of investigations, the House of Representatives’ report concluded
that the Soviet NKVD was responsible for the “Katyn massacre.” The findings of the report
brought along more concerns than intended political usages of the Katyn massacre for the United
States House of Representatives. In the conclusion of the investigation, the committee became
gravely anxious over the discovery of the State and War Department’s cover-up of the truth, the
acceptance of the Soviet narrative of “truth” about the massacre, and the perceived abandonment
of the London Poles by the United States following the Yalta Conference.125 In the end, these
discoveries would be utilized as a political strategy by the Republicans in an attempt to gain East
European voters away from Democrats in the 1952 election.126 Though the investigation has
been viewed as a rather anticlimactic event in the tensions between the United States and Soviet
Union, the investigation led way to a hospitable environment in which Polish émigré in the
United States could produce publications, like Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn
Massacre.

At the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the
groundbreaking study, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Massacre by J.K. Zawodny,
was published by the University of Notre Dame Press in 1962. Scholar George Sanford refers to
the work as “the best public examination of the Katyn evidence,” until the Soviet documentation
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of Katyń became available in 1990 and subsequent analyses of these materials by Russian
scholars, Natalia S. Lebedeva and Vladimir Abarinov were produced.127 While several scholars
have praised the work for its merit and for its objective focus on the Polish, Soviet, and German
government evidence, testimonies, and other supporting documents, there has not been
substantial discussion on Zawodny as a historical actor in the process of memory making of
Katyń in the Polish émigré community.128

Born in Poland, Janusz Kazimierz Zawodny was a Polish historian and political scientist.
During the outbreak of the Second World War, Zawodny was a soldier in the Polish army. On
September 24, 1939, Zawodny was captured by the Soviet army. He was set to be deported by
the NKVD following his capture by Soviet forces. Zawodny escaped through the Soviet-German
border and returned to Warsaw. During the German occupation of Poland, he fought in the
Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Following the capitulation of Warsaw on October 5th, 1944, he was
taken prisoner and interned in a German prison camp. After the liberation of the camp, Zawodny
joined the Second Polish Army corps, in the military unit led by General Władysław Anders in
Italy. Following the end of the Second World War and the institution of the Soviet aligned
government in the PRL, he emigrated to the United States. He received his academic training and
Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1955.129
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Zawodny’s first major publication, Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyń Forest
Massacre, attempts to reconstruct the “fate” of the thousands of Polish officers murdered in the
Katyń Forest near Smolensk.130 The author sought to answer the questions:

1). Who killed these men?
2). How were they killed?
3). Why were they killed? 131
The work is divided into nine chapters, examining the immediate historical context of the
captured Polish officers grounded in the preconditions to the commencement of the Second
World War to “problems caused by Katyn” in the 1950s.132 Throughout the monograph,
Zawodny utilizes and analyzes government documents in an attempt to answer the questions put
forth by the study. Within the third chapter of the work titled “The Inconvenient Allies — Alive
and Dead,” Zawodny provides invaluable insight into some of the perceptions that ordinary Poles
had prior to the “discovery” of the mass graves by German forces and the publications of the
Katyń lists:
“When the discovery of the graves in Katyn was announced, I was in Warsaw. It
was generally believed by the Poles that this was a hoax to drive a wedge between
the Soviet Union and the other Allies and that Goebbels was wielding the
hammer. Then the first list of names and the pictures appeared in the daily
(German-controlled) paper. The name-lists were read in radio broadcasts. The
Polish delegations returned from Katyn spreading their observations. It was true!
The Underground community had its own sources at the science for verification—
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they confirmed. The crescendo of German propaganda might as well not have
existed. The Underground knew for certain that the Polish prisoners-of-war had
been killed on Soviet territory. But by whom?”133

The selected quote from Zawodny’s Death in the Forest further elucidates upon the effect
of the German Nazi propaganda campaign on ordinary Poles living in German occupied Poland
that was previously examined in the last chapter of this thesis project. Within the final chapter of
the work, Zawodny examines present problems created by the legacy of Katyń in the
contemporary PRL. Zawodny analyzes the suppression of the Katyn massacre by the PRL
government through assassinations, propaganda publications, and relative government
suppression of the “truth” about the Katyń crime. The work utilizes a wide breath of available
documentation in the German, Polish, Russian, and English languages that provides significant
insight into the understandings of Katyń by contemporaries. In addition to the elucidation upon
the perceptions held by Poles in response to the discovery of the Katyń, the work also highlights
an important attribute of the Katyń story that scholars have overlooked: the role of the FRG
(West Germany). Throughout the study, Zawodny utilized German documentation and archival
materials from the FRG. In the concluding chapter of the work, Zawodny asserts that the West
German press does not consider the Katyn case closed. In the FRG, German public opinion
“does not wish Germany to be blamed for this murder.”134

As evidenced through a brief examination of the work, the politics of memory played a
significant role in the publication of Death in the Forest, particularly due to the author’s access
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to the West German documentary materials. The legacy of Death in the Forest is resounding. In
present-day studies of the mass executions of the Polish officers, police officers, and members of
the intelligentsia, Zawodny’s contribution is still heavily utilized. Zawodny’s contribution to the
historiography demonstrates a dual project of the history and memory makings of Katyń.

Did the work influence ordinary Poles living within the PRL? While the work left an
inconsequential impact on the English language speaking communities in the United States and
Great Britain, it is difficult to postulate whether Death in the Forest made quite the impact as
Zbrodnia Katyńska did in the PRL. Zbrodnia Katyńska made an invaluable impact on the
founding memorialization culture of the Powązkowski Cemetery in Warsaw. We will briefly
analyze the processes and representation of memorialization in the following chapter in locations
within the PRL, like the Powązkowski Military Cemetery in Warsaw.

48

CHAPTER FOUR: REPRESENTATIONS OF KATYŃ BY POLES LIVING
WITHIN THE PRL

Introduction
Representations of Katyń by ordinary Poles living within the PRL was a dangerous
endeavor to undertake following the institution of a Soviet aligned government in the PRL. In
official state memory, the perpetrators of the crime were German forces and the crime was
committed during the German occupation of Smolensk in 1941. Throughout the existence of the
PRL, there was only one written work legally published on the issue of Katyń. Published in 1952,
Bolesław Wójcicki’s Prawda o Katyniu (The Truth About Katyń) posited that Katyń was the work
of German forces during the German occupation of Smolensk in 1941.135 Within Prawda o
Katyniu, Wójcicki argues against the ongoing United States House of Representatives’
investigation on the Katyń as a “violation of the sovereignty of Poland.”136 In its essence, Prawda
o Katyniu represented the official state’s representation and official memory of Katyń. In private
and collective memories of ordinary Poles, the official state memory was rejected in many cases.137

Powązkowski Military Cemetery, Warsaw
Despite the legal and potentially fatal risks, acts of commemoration and representation did
occur behind the gates of cemeteries and churches. Until the Solidarność period, public
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memorialization of Katyń took the form of the sacralization and memorialization of the dead in
spaces like cemeteries. One of the most well-known locations of the contested memorialization of
Katyń between the government and ordinary Poles in the PRL is the Powązkowski Military
Cemetery in Warsaw. The cemetery holds a cultural and political significance to Poles. The
cemetery holds the graves of many fallen Poles during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The main
site of memorialization to the Katyń victims is the space adjacent to the monument to the wartime
forces of the Polish underground, Armia Krajowa (AK, hereafter).138 The monument was built in
1946, containing a black obelisk crowned by a Polish eagle and inscribed with the date 1939-1945
and the phrase “Gloria Victis” (“Glory to the Vanquished”).139 The circulation of Zbrodnia
Katynska by the Polish underground in the PRL would make an inconsequential impact on the
commemoration of the Katyń dead in Warsaw’s Powązkowski Military Cemetery.140 The
monument in the Powązkowski Cemetery would soon become a place of pilgrimage and
commemoration to the executed Polish prisoners of war in Katyń and those who were killed during
the Warsaw Uprising in the late 1940s.141 In the contemporaries’ understanding, Katyń would be
equated with the loss and mourning experienced in the wake of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. The
Warsaw Uprising represented an event of significant loss to Poles in the early years of the PRL.

It is critical to note that throughout the early representations and commemorations of
Katyń in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery, the focal point of the commemoration was on the
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memory of the dead, rather than asserting who killed the Polish officers and when through these
representations. Nevertheless, the commemorations posed a real threat to the government of the
PRL.142 In 1959 on All Souls’ Day, a wooden cross was placed in the cemetery with the inscription:
“Symbolic grave of the 12,000 Polish officers murdered in Katyń. They were Poles, and they died
on foreign soil at the hands of a brutal enemy. They deserve to be remembered and to be
honored.”143 The wooden cross was removed, and an immediate government backed investigation
took place. Although the PRL government first suspected the involvement of the AK, the identity
of the person that erected the cross was soon revealed: Ludwika Dymecka, the wife of executed
Polish officer Wojciech Dymecki, whose name was mentioned on the Katyń List.144 Prior to the
confession, Dymecka had been caught distributing pamphlets and leaflets on the site. 145 The
investigative team decided not to pursue charges against Dymecka, due to the “mental illness” that
she was allegedly suffering from, as determined by PRL officials.146 Throughout the 1960s and
1970s, other Poles would erect crosses and flowers on the site, building upon Dymecka’s initial
project. The continued, clandestine memorialization was spread by word of mouth among
Warsaw’s residents.
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In addition to the clandestine memorialization and commemoration at the Powązkowski
Military Cemetery, the memory of the Katyń dead was also constructed and maintained within the
Katyń families (Rodziny Katyńskie). “Rodziny Katyńskie” refers to the families that lost a family
member in the series of mass executions that came to be collectively known as “Katyń.” Because
the Katyń families could not publicly discuss the loss of their family members without fear of legal
retribution, the memories of their executed family members were often told through stories told in
the privacy of their homes:
“Someone recently asked me how old I was when my father decided to tell me
about my grandfather, who was killed at Katyń. In Communist Poland, people
were afraid of this knowledge, as a child could show off such a story on the
playground or at school—and the family would be in real trouble! I didn’t
understand the question, because there was one thing Dad did not tolerate: fear. I
always knew that my grandfather was killed by the “Russians” in Katyń—and I
also always knew that what was said at home with family was not discussed
outside the house. But in hearing such a question, I understood that beneath it lies
the greatest drama of contemporary Polish history, a drama of remembrance: that
there were such homes in which fear did not allow children to be taught the truth.
Perhaps this is why we, Katyń Families, are able to exist for so many years. We
simply tell our stories.”147

Ludwika Dymecka, a member of the Katyń families, inspired further clandestine efforts at
the memorialization site in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery. The representations of
remembrance and mourning at the Powązkowski Military Cemetery would often coincide with
significant dates to Poles: the anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising on August 1st, the anniversary
of the Crime of Katyń, the anniversary of the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union on September
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17th, and All Saints Day on November 1st.148 Government officials would soon remove the crosses,
flowers, and other relics to the memory of the Katyń dead. The site would become known as
“Dolinka Katyńska—Katyń’s Hollow.” Throughout the existence of the PRL, the commemoration
of Katyń in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery would become “a war of monuments” between
the government and ordinary Polish citizens.149 This war of monuments would reach a height
during the Solidarność period in the early 1980s.

Solidarność
During the mid-1970s, Poland’s economy began to dramatically deteriorate.150 In response
to the worsening economic conditions and the perceived inefficiency of the government, tensions
and unrest arose among Polish workers across the country. On June 25th, 1976, the first notable
widespread strikes erupted across Poland. Workers from at least 130 factories went on strike and
took to the streets to protest the unexpected, steep price increases of food items across Poland.
This announced was given by the Polish Sejm the day prior to the strikes.151 Soon, the call for
action in workers’ protests transitioned from economic concerns to demands for human rights and
autonomy among Poles living within the PRL. In August 1980, approximately one million workers
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assembled in factory halls and shipyards demanding human rights and autonomy across the
PRL.152

Amid these protests and strikes, one of the most significant movements in modern Polish
history was born. Following a series of workers’ strikes in response to the termination of Anna
Walentynowicz at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, the independent trade union Solidarność
(Solidarity) was formed out of a series of negotiations between PRL officials and trade union
workers in 1980.153 The negotiations came in the aftermath of strikes across the country over
Walentynowicz’s termination, due to her support of trade unions. The termination came just fifty
days before her scheduled retirement.154 The termination shocked the nation, as Walentynowicz
represented the many trials that the nation had experienced within the tumultuous twentieth
century. Walentynowicz was an orphan of the Second World War, a single parent, and a skilled
crane operator of thirty years in the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. Walentynowicz’s termination was
based on her political opposition to the PRL government, through her support of trade unions.
Another unemployed worker at the Lenin Shipyard, Lech Wałęsa, inspired Walentynowicz’s
coworkers at the Shipyard to strike.155
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From its inception, Solidarność had “sought to limit itself” to trade union specific issues
and not partake in national politics. 156 Solidarność was the first and only free trade union
movement formed in the “Soviet bloc.”157 Solidarność was also the only movement to be legally
recognized by a communist, Soviet aligned government until the declaration of martial law and
the subsequent legal dissolution of Solidarność was implemented on December 12, 1981. The
trade union movement soon began to concern itself with more than just trade union specific
issues. After one year, over ten million people belonged to Solidarność from across the PRL.
Solidarność was the largest and “most successful display” of political activism to emerge in
Soviet aligned countries during the post-war period.158 Solidarność members had created an
independent press, adult education courses, political clubs, and more in the PRL.159 Even before
the declaration of martial law, Solidarność became a symbol of anticommunist protest to
ordinary Poles throughout the country. Thus, it is within this political-economic context that the
“symbolic war” between the PRL’s government, the Catholic Church, and opposition
movements like Solidarność occurred.160 One of the most pressing issues and symbols utilized in
this “war” was Katyń. For Poles living within the PRL, the issue of the Katyń crime transitioned
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from a war of commemoration and remembrance to a war of protest and symbols used against
communist government officials during the Solidarność period.

Katyń in Solidarność Speeches, Publications, and Protests at the Powązkowski
Military Cemetery
Throughout the August 1980 strikes at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, shipyard workers
were cognizant of the “larger” issues at hand for ordinary Poles living within the PRL.161 Even
before the trade union movement was legally formed in September 1980, the issue of Katyń
appeared as a concern to workers on strike in the Lenin Shipyard. The workers behind the August
1980 strikes demanded for the reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Wałęsa at the
shipyard, the director’s guarantees of no future reprisals against workers on strike, a pay raise of
two thousand złoty, and a memorial to the murdered workers who were killed in the December
1970 protests.162 Amidst a disagreement between the shipyard director and workers over the
placement and possibility of the memorial, an angry worker responded:
“We are haggling over dead bodies like blind beggars under the lamp post. You’re
talking about planning problems….people have been waiting for a monument to
fifteen thousand Polish soldiers murdered by the Soviet government in Katyń
thirty years,,,,I beg your pardon forty years….how much longer…”163
As the strikes evolved, so did the “symbolic dimension” of the strikes. Through symbols,
ceremonies, and writings, workers were able to express their feelings, emotions, and thoughts
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surrounding a multitude of political, economic, social, and “existential” issues like Katyń.164
During the Solidarność period, the crime of Katyń was frequently mentioned throughout
Solidarność’s publications. In doing so, Solidarność built upon the efforts made by the
clandestine “Katyń Institute,” by publishing its own editions and translations of Katyń
documentation previously published outside Poland.165 At Solidarność’s First Congress in
Gdańsk-Oliwa in September-October 1981, the trade union movement’s “feelings” over Katyń
emerged on the political, public stage. The First Congress’ building had Katyń memorial posters
decorating the walls, and materials on the subject for sale.166 The issue was also frequently raised
in government negotiations and debates between Solidarność and government officials prior to
the institution of martial law in 1981.167.
At the height of the Solidarność period, commemorations for the Katyń dead continued at
the Powązkowski Military Cemetery in Warsaw. On July 31, 1981, Solidarność member Stefan
Melak led a group of thirty-seven people to Dolinka Katyńska—the contested memorial site for
the Katyń dead—in the Powązkowski Military Cemetery. Melak had been participating in the
clandestine memorialization of the Katyń dead at the cemetery for many years. Melak and his
follows erected a memorial that would be rather difficult for government officials to remove. The
memorial was a massive stone cross, weighing nearly four tons and measuring at four meters
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tall.168 With his brother Arkadiusz, Father Wacław Karlowicz, and many others, Melak began the
construction of the memorial in 1979. The memorial read: “Katyń, Ostaszków, Kozielsk,
Starobielsk, 1940.”169 The date on the memorial was a radical break from previous
memorialization of the Katyń dead at the Powązkowski Cemetery. Prior to the erection of this
memorial, the issue of when the mass executions of the Polish soldiers did not appear in
memorialization and representations within the cemetery. During the Solidarność period, the
memorial was erected as a political, protest symbol of remembrance—the date was a severe
formal accusation of the Soviet culpability of the crime.170 PRL government officials quickly
dismantled the memorial the following night.

Four years after the dismantlement and disappearance of the Melak memorial, PRL
government officials erected their own memorial to the Katyń dead in the Powązkowski
Cemetery.171 The memorial bore the year “1941” and attributed the deaths of 4,321 Polish
officers to “Hitlerite fascism.”172 The inscription read: “To the Polish soldiers-victims of the
Hitlerite fascism that arose on the soil of Katyn.”173 News of the government backed memorial
spread by word of mouth in Warsaw. The memorial outraged many Warsaw residents over the
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inscriptions on the memorial, stating that the officers murdered at Katyn were executed by
German forces. In a New York Times article, one “young engineer” stated that, “It is simply
shocking to blame Katyn on the Germans when everyone knows who was responsible.”174 The
“war of monuments” would continue. Immediately following the erection of the government
backed memorial, Warsaw residents scratched “1940-N.K.V.D.” into the memorial. Alongside
the memorial, thirty memorial candles flickered. Many Poles held the view that the Katyn dead
and the rest of the 15,000 Polish officers were murdered by the NKVD. In 1987, protestors
installed a plaque directly citing the Soviets as responsible for the murders at Katyń. Following
the collapse of communism within the country in 1989, the Melak memorial was “found” and
reinstalled at the site in 1995.175

Katyń as the Test of Glasnost: Representation in Government Debates and the
Role of Contingency in the Release of the Documents
On December 12, 1981, General Jaruzelski declared martial law in the PRL. Following
the institution of martial law, Solidarność was outlawed. Thousands of members of the trade
union movement, like Lech Wałęsa, were arrested. While Solidarność was illegal within the
PRL, the trade union movement did not cease its political efforts. The organization simply went
underground. In the aftermath of the declaration of martial law, seven Solidarność members—
notably all women—helped form the vital, clandestine networks for the trade union movement to
continue its efforts.176 Following the declaration of martial law and the suppression of
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Solidarność, homemade banners with the words “Katyń” and “Solidarność” appeared throughout
Polish cemeteries accompanying candles and memorials.177

Two years after the declaration was given, martial law would come to an end in Poland.
Solidarność members, like Wałęsa, were free to return to work.178 Solidarność would largely
continue to operate underground until glasnost reached Poland in the late 1980s. In 1985, the
new head of the Soviet communist party, Mikhail Gorbachev, instituted a series of policies
(perestroika and glasnost) that would have profound effects on the Katyń issue in the PRL.
Perestroika refers to the policy of restructuring the economic structure of the USSR. Glasnost
refers to the policy of ‘openness,” restructuring the political system of the USSR as a more
democratized apparatus. 179 Because of glasnost, media was allowed more literary freedoms.
This would have profound effects on the release of the Katyń documents and the announcement
of the Soviet responsibility for the crime of Katyń by Gorbachev in 1990. In addition to the
institution of glasnost, Gorbachev and General Jaruzelski of the PRL established a joint historical
commission to investigate “blank spots” in the two countries shared histories, namely over the
issue of Katyń in 1987.180
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In Poland, perestroika and glasnost’s effects reached the country slowly. In Struggle and
Triumph, Lech Wałęsa notes that in 1987, while “perestroika had not yet reached Poland…its
effects were beginning to be felt, and one of those effects was to offer us a new alternative.”181
Following the government of the PRL’s announcements of price increases in early 1988, strikes
broke out across Poland. Throughout the majority of 1988, strikes occurred across the country in
shipyards, factories, steel yards, and mines. Among the back drop of the strikes in the early
spring of 1988, Poles learned that Gorbachev was set to visit Poland on July 11, 1988.182 The
visit would highlight the continued significance of Katyń among Poles. In a United Press
International newspaper article dated July 10th, 1988, Katyń was listed as the “biggest test of
glasnost” ahead of Gorbachev’s scheduled visit to Poland in summer 1988. 183 Within the article,
Polish Cardinal Josef Glemp stated that the “most important problem is Katyń.”184 While
Gorbachev did not discuss Katyń during his visit to Poland in July 1988, Katyń would soon
become the test of glasnost for an unlikely adversary against the Soviet Union—the communist
government of the PRL.
At the end of 1988 and early 1989, Solidarność leaders engaged in several round table
talks with PRL government officials. Amidst these round table talks, the PRL’s official state
newspaper Odrodzenie published documentary evidence on the Katyń crime in February 1989.
Within the publication, the Polish communist authorities declared that Soviet forces were the
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perpetrators of the Katyń crime. The report also cited the murders of at least 4,200 Polish officers
at the hands of Soviet forces.185 The report was the first official state account published
throughout the entire existence of the PRL that posited Soviet forces were the perpetrators of the
Katyń crime. The report’s publishing was the true test of glasnost for Poles and the Polish
government over the issue of Katyń. There was no military, legal, or punitive action taken
against the Polish government by the Soviet government in response to the report’s publishing.
The round table discussions between Solidarność and PRL government officials ended
with an agreement calling for unrestricted elections to 35% of the Polish Sejm, with the rest
reserved for Soviet aligned Polish communist party members and all of the available seats in the
Senat. On April 17, 1989, Solidarność was legally reinstated and registered in the PRL.186 In
June 1989, Solidarność won 99 of the 100 of Senat seats and every available seat in the Sejm.187
Following the elections, the Polish media increased their pressure for the truth surrounding
Katyń. 188 In the August 19th, 1989 edition of Polityka, Polish historians recounted the known
history of the Katyń crime and concluded that the NKVD were the perpetrators of the series of
mass executions of Polish officers. On October 12th, the Polish press reported that the Polish
prosecutor general “had requested his Soviet opposite number to conduct an investigation.”189
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Throughout government negotiations and conversations between the Polish and Soviet
governments in late 1989 and early 1990, Katyń remained a central issue.

The events of November 1989 marked the symbolic end of communism in Eastern
Europe. In political contemporaries’ minds, however, the end of the Soviet Union was not yet a
reality. In the early months of 1990, negotiations took place between Polish officials and Soviet
officials over shared diplomatic concerns between the two states. On January 18th, 1990, Soviet
Ambassador Vladimir Brokikov visited with Lech Wałęsa in Gdańsk. In a conversation between
the two, Wałęsa noted that the “Communist system, maintained by military might, was slowly
but surely receding into the past.”190 According to Wałęsa, the key to establishing new relations
between the governments was to first:
“fill in the blank pages of Polish-Soviet history: those involving the USSR’s
attack on Poland on September 17, 1939; the massacres at Katyn Forest and
elsewhere of fifteen thousands Poles, mostly officers and intellectuals; and the
deportation of hundreds of thousand of Poles to Siberia for forced labor.”191

On the forty-seventh anniversary of the Radio Berlin’s announcement of the discovery of
the mass graves at Katyń, the Soviet government announced its responsibility for the mass
executions of Polish officers in the Katyń Forest on April 13th, 1990. The Soviet government
officially accepted the blame for murdering over 15,000 Polish officers, who were interned in the
Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov camps in the Soviet Union between March and June 1940.
On April 14th, Gorbachev released selected documents to President Jaruzelski, to aid the Polish
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president, whose position was being challenged by “more liberal forces.”192 Even with the
release of the “truth,” the announcement still produced great anxiety among Poles, like
Wałęsa.193 The issue of Katyń was not resolved in the minds of Poles.

In Polish collective memory and subsequent publications detailing the events of 1990, the
successful efforts to gain the “truth” about Katyń from Soviet officials are often depicted and
remembered as a result of the efforts of Solidarność and its leaders, like Lech Wałęsa.194 While
Solidarność played an inconsequential role in the events of 1989 and the “fall” of communism in
Poland, it was the collective efforts of Solidarność, Polish officials, and contemporaries living
within the Soviet Union that led to the release of the documents in 1990. In the Soviet Union,
historians, scholars, and writers took a strong interest in the issue of Katyń in light of glasnost
and the establishment of the joint commission to investigate shared “blank spots” in PolishSoviet histories. On May 11, 1988, Literaturnaya Gazeta correspondent Vladimir Abarinov
published an article positing that the NKVD was responsible for the crime, “Blank Spots: From
Emotions to Fact.”195 The reception of the article was critical; hundreds of editorial replies were
submitted to the magazine refuting Abarinov’s claims. Throughout the various letter
submissions, Abarinov received a letter of critical importance: from Alexei Lukin, a member of
the 136th battalion that was stationed at Kozelsk in 1940. During a search through available
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records on the 136th battalion, Abarinov found evidence that thousands of Polish officers who
were held at Kozelsk were sent to Smolensk and never returned.196
Following the Polish government’s publication on documentation surrounding Katyń in
February 1989, Soviet officials wrote in a note to the party Central Committee that the time was
optimal to tell the truth about Katyń. In late March 1989, Russian historians Natalia Lebedeva,
Yuri Zoria, and Valentina Parsadanova found documents in Soviet archives containing the names
of Polish officers sent to the internment camps, like Kozelsk, Starobelsk, and Ostashkov.197
Several Soviet officials advised Gorbachev to release the truth about Katyń to Polish President
Jaruzelski. Gorbachev remained adamant that he would not do so. Two key factors finally
pressed Gorbachev and the Politburo to admit Soviet culpability in Katyń in April 1990. In the
early months of 1990, Polish President Jaruzelski sent an official memorandum stating that if
Gorbachev would not release the truth surrounding Katyń, he would not proceed with his
planned presidential visit to Moscow in April.198 The second factor was more pressing and
ultimately forced Gorbachev’s hand.199 On March 25, 1990, Moskovskie Novosti published
documents on the 136th battalion compiled by Abarinov, an interview with Lebedeva, and the
documents found by Lebedeva. The article was titled “The Katyn Tragedy” and it was published
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without the government’s permission.200,201 Lebedeva recalls the aftermath of the release of the
documents as having the effect of a “bomb explosion.”202 On April 13th, the Soviet news agency
TASS declared Soviet responsibility for the disappearances of over 14,000 Polish officers in
1940. The announcement declared that nearly 15,000 prisoners from the Kozelsk, Ostashkov,
and Starobelsk prisoner camps had been transferred to the NKVD administrations in Smolensk,
Voroshilovgrad, and Kalinin oblasts. They would not appear again in any subsequent NKVD
records. The news agency reported that the documents were given to Polish authorities.203 The
“truth” surrounding Katyń emerged as a process and the moment was contingent—the pressure
placed upon Gorbachev by Soviet writers, journalists, and scholars led to the release of the
documents in April 1990. It is vital to note that some elements of the “truth” surrounding Katyń
were still shrouded in secrecy at the time of the documents’ release in 1990.

Following the release of the documents to Jaruzelski and the announcement of Soviet
responsibility of the crime, there still remained many unanswered questions surrounding the
crime of Katyń. While the who and when had been answered by Soviet state officials
surrounding the Katyń crime, there were several documents missing from the collection to
answer the question: why were the Polish officers murdered? For many ordinary Poles, the
questions surrounding who killed the Polish officers and when they had been murdered had
already been answered in the memory making processes of Katyń. In the aftermath of the
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documents’ release, Poles continued to pressure Gorbachev for more information surrounding
the mass executions.204 In response, Gorbachev ordered further investigation on Katyń in late
1990.
The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 did not negatively affect the Katyń
investigation. Rather, the collapse of the USSR provided the political conditions that made it
possible for the release of the most damning document in the possession of the Soviet state over
Katyń: the March 1940 Politburo order to execute the 21,000+ Polish officers.205 In December
1991, Gorbachev gave Russian President Boris Yeltsin the documents about Katyń, including the
1940 Politburo order in a final meeting of the Soviet state. 206 Gorbachev encouraged Yeltsin to
seriously consider the implications of the release of the documents, because “I am afraid they can
lead to international complications. However, it is up to you to decide.”207 After reading the
documents, Yeltsin would not provide the documents to Polish officials for over ten months. In
January 1992, Polish President Lech Wałęsa wrote to Yeltsin, requesting Polish officials’ access
to the archives surrounding 1939 and the invasion of Poland by the Soviet Union.208 This request
would not be granted until the Russian state’s release of the documents ten months later. On
October 14th, 1992, Chief Russian Archivist Pikhoia delivered the documents, including the
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March 1940 Politburo execution order, to President Wałęsa in Warsaw under the orders of
Yeltsin. At the same time, the order was broadcasted on the Russian state news agency ITARTASS.209 The historical “truth” surrounding Katyń as we know it today was learned on October
14th, 1992.

In early March 1940, the fate of 21,000+ Polish military and police officers, and various
members of the intelligentsia was sealed. In a review of the cases of over 21,000+ Polish
prisoners of war, Josef Stalin ordered the execution of these persons, as “committed and
incorrigible enemies of Soviet power.”210 High ranking officials of the Soviet state, like Josef
Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov, signed the order.211 The order set the mass executions in motion.
Many of the thousands of murdered Polish officers were not always shot at the site of the mass
graves in places like the Katyń Forest as first believed during the initial exhumations of the site.
Many officers were shot in an execution room in NKVD dachas and headquarters. About twenty
percent of the victims had their hands tied behind their back and a rope binding tied from their
necks to their hands. If the prisoners attempted to move, they would suffocate. Scholars like
David Satter believe that the prisoners found with their hands tied behind their backs were likely
shot at the burial sites, particularly marking them as prisoners that had attempted to resist before
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their execution.212 The prisoners were executed in sites such as the Katyń Forest, the Kalinin and
Kharkov prisons, and remote sites throughout present-day Ukraine and Belarus.

Why did Stalin order the mass execution of over 21,000+ Polish prisoners? Since the
release of the Katyń documents in the early 1990s, the question has been a popular topic of
inquiry in scholarship produced on Katyń. The answer to this question is not straightforward and,
in many cases, relies on scholars’ understandings of the perceptions of the Borderlands, Poles,
and the Polish-Soviet war that Soviet leadership held at the outset of the Second World War.
Scholar Natalia Lebedeva believes that the decision to shoot these prisoners was a result of the
Soviet leadership’s initiatives to maintain the security of the Borderlands, the perceived “failure”
to re-educate the Polish officers on the issue of Polish independence, and the “bitter memory”
that Stalin held over his suffering in Poland during the Polish-Soviet war.213

The release of the 1992 documents did not end the continued memory making processes
of Katyń. Russian and Polish historians came to realize that documentation was still missing
surrounding Katyń. Blank spots remained in the history of the mass executions of the Polish
military and members of the intelligentsia. Scholars could not, and still cannot, locate the
documentation on the death sentences and the execution sites in parts of present day Belarus and
Ukraine.214 In present-day Poland, Katyń is an integral attribute to national identity making and
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understandings of suffering in the country. In the concluding portion of this project, I will briefly
examine representations of Katyń since 1990.

70

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION, WHAT WAS KATYŃ AND WHAT HAS
IT BEEN SINCE 1990?

What was Katyń? As noted throughout this project, Katyń has come to symbolize a
myriad of meanings dependent upon the historical actors representing Katyń over time. Since the
release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992, the memory making processes and tensions
surrounding Katyń have not ceased. In the aftermath of the documents’ releases in 1990 and
1992, official reconciliations of memory surrounding Katyń began to take place in public spaces
throughout the Republic of Poland. The release of the documents and the acknowledgement of
Soviet culpability allowed public discourse about Katyń to occur in Poland, thus enabling the
erection of public memorials and an end to the “war of monuments.” Public memorials began to
mark the memory landscape in cities across Poland. Through these memorials, one can see that
Katyń has become an integral symbol in the state’s efforts to create national identity from their
contentious and tumultuous twentieth century past. Following decades of state enforced silence
surrounding Katyń, Katyń has now become synonymous with national suffering in present-day
Poland.

Katyń Memorials: Kraków (1990) and Wadowice (2010)
Fifty years following the mass executions of Polish officers by the NKVD, a Katyń
memorial was erected in Kraków, one of Poland’s largest cities, in 1990. The memorial is
located on ulica Grodzka (Grodzka Street) adjacent to the Wawel Castle.215 The location of the
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memorial holds significance, as the Wawel Castle is a site of important cultural significance to
Poles, as well as a major tourist attraction in one of the country’s largest cities.216 The memorial
is a large cross, with the word “Katyń” between the dates “1940” and “1990,” accompanied by a
commemorative plaque. The plaque reads: “Kozielsk, Ostashków, Starobielsk,” among other
Polish cities of cultural and historical significance, such as Poznań, Gdańsk, and Nowa Huta,
where significant trade union strikes took place during the 1970s and 1980s.217 While the
location of the memorial is in close proximity to Wawel, the commemoration is primarily
intended for a Polish audience, as the plaque’s inscription is in the Polish language.
Located just fifty kilometers from Kraków, there is another significant Katyń memorial in
Wadowice. Wadowice holds a cultural and religious significance to Poles, as it is the birth place
of Pope John Paul II. The city is a large tourist attraction in present-day Poland. The memorial
to the Katyń dead is located in Plac Solidarnśći (Solidarity Square), located very close to the
main train station.218 The memorial was erected on April 22, 2010. Similar to the Katyń
memorial in Kraków, the Wadowice Katyń memorial has the word “Katyń” on the cross. At the
base of the memorial, there are two hands bound together, lifting up from the ground,
symbolizing the murdered Polish officers in the Katyń Forest. Behind the cross, there is a list of
the names of the murdered officers from Wadowice, with a commemorative quote from Pope
John Paul II. While the audience of the memorial is primarily intended for a Polish audience, the
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memorial is situated on the path to the city center, making the memorial rather difficult to miss
by tourists and residents of Wadowice alike.
It is important to problematize the symbols within the memorials to the Katyń dead in
places like Kraków and Wadowice, particularly due to the utilization of the cross in the
memorials. Associated with Christianity and the notion of suffering, the cross holds a myriad of
significances for Poles. As Jan Kubik argues, the cross in Poland holds a political connotation of
resistance, a “metaphor of national martyrdom,” and Poland as the “Messiah of nations.”219 The
memorial represents Katyń as a symbol of national suffering, as “Katyń” appears to be crucified
on the cross in places like Kraków and Wadowice. The memorial is not wholly inclusive of the
entirety of the Katyń dead: eight percent of those executed by the NKVD were Jewish,
Ukrainian, and Belorussian.220
There also remains differences in the Katyń memorials that show a shift in the
representation of Katyń in present-day Poland. In the 1990 Kraków memorial, the plaque
contains an inscription of the names of cultural and historical significant sites of “Soviet
aggression,” towards ordinary Poles during and following the Second World War.221 As noted by
Danielle Drozdzewski, the memorial is “intended to reference the years of silence and
acknowledgement and reinforce the on-going strength of private memory.”222 In the 2010
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Wadowice memorial, the names of the murdered Wadowice officers are listed behind the cross
with a commemorative quote by Pope John Paul II. In stark contrast from the Kraków memorial,
the Wadowice memorial highlights the individuals executed in the Katyń Forest.
Representations, like the Kraków memorial and the Wadowice memorial to the Katyń dead,
continue to contribute to the memory making processes of Katyń and the making of the national
narrative of suffering in present-day Poland.223

Andrzej Wajda’s Katyń and Its Meaning In The 2010 Plane Crash Near
Smolensk, Russia: A Second Katyń?
In 2007, Polish film director Andrzej Wajda released the film Katyń in Poland. Prior to
the release of the film, there remained no feature length film on Katyń in Poland.224 The project
held personal significance to Wajda, as his father, Jakub Wajda, was murdered in the Kharkiv
prison in the series of mass executions that came to be known as Katyń. The film follows a series
of characters, alternating between narrative focuses on the Katyń families struggling to
commemorate their dead throughout the early days of the PRL, and the Polish officers in the
Kozelsk internment camps prior to their executions. The film does not show the mass executions
of Polish officers until the very end of the film, representing the “blank spot” that Katyń
represented in Polish collective memory.225 As the Polish officers are being executed, each one
recites a line of the Lord’s Prayer. The symbolism is significant, as Wajda invokes the idea of
Polish martyrdom throughout the closing portion of the film. The film was widely and
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successfully received in Poland. The debut of the film represented an important point in the
public representation of Katyń in present-day Poland.
The film’s debut also had reverberating effects in Polish-Russian relations. For the
seventieth anniversary of the Katyń massacre, a symbolic memorial ceremony was set to occur
between Polish and Russian officials at the Katyń Forest site in April 2010. Although Wajda’s
Katyń had been previously banned in Russia, the film was set to be debuted on both minor and
major public television channels around the commemorations of the anniversary of the Katyń
crime. The Russian minor television channel, Kul’tura, broadcasted Wajda’s Katyń ahead of the
joint commemoration on April 2, 2010.226 The President of Poland, Lech Kaczyński, was set to
lead the ceremony with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. One day following the scheduled
ceremony, Wajda’s Katyń was set to be broadcasted on one of Russia’s major public television
channels.
On April 10, 2010, new ground emerged within the Katyń memory landscape. In route to
the joint Katyń memorial between the Russian and Polish governments, Polish President
Kaczyński’s plane crashed near Smolensk, Russia. Kaczyński and the other occupants on board,
such as Solidarność member Anna Walentynowicz, were killed instantly in the crash. The
invocation of Katyń to describe the national tragedy in the aftermath of the plane crash was
immediate. Former Polish President and Solidarność leader Lech Wałęsa famously referred to
the crash as the second Katyń.227 The site of the plane crash held deep symbolic meaning to
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Poles, as the crash happened near the site where the mass graves were first discovered in the
Katyń Forest.228 Now, Katyń held another meaning to Poles: the site of two national tragedies
that occurred just seventy years apart from one another. In the aftermath of the crash, Wajda’s
Katyń was broadcasted on numerous major Russian television channels. Russian President
Dmitrii Medvedev declared a national day of mourning in Russia to commemorate the plane
crash—and by extension, the crime of Katyń.229

Conclusion: Katyń
The invocation of Katyń in the aftermath of the 2010 Kaczyński plane crash demonstrates
the central importance that Katyń still holds in the politics of memory in present-day Poland.
More than seventy years following the mass executions of over twenty thousand Polish officers
and members of the intelligentsia occurred, the symbolic meaning of Katyń continues as a
process in the political, memory landscape of present-day Poland. From the commencement of
the mass executions throughout remote sites in the Soviet Union, Katyń has represented a myriad
of meanings in the collective memories of states and society throughout time. The understanding,
representations, “truth,” and narratives surrounding Katyń have undoubtedly been influenced by
the politics of memory at every stage of the Katyń story.
In 1943, the “discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest commenced a period of
contention between the German, Soviet, and the exiled Polish governments over the identity of
the forces that executed the 21,000+ Polish military, police officer, and members of the
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intelligentsia. Between the German and Soviet governments, Katyń became a political
bargaining tool of propaganda against the enemy during the Second World War and the
immediate post-war period throughout the Nuremberg Trials. The German and Soviet
governments blamed one another for the crime through a series of communique issued
throughout the early part of 1943. For nearly five decades, the identity of the perpetrators of the
execution of the Polish officers was a contested issue between the official state memory and
narrative of the crime, and the collective memories of Polish émigrés and Poles living within the
PRL.

For ordinary Poles living within the PRL and for the Polish émigrés living within the
United States and Great Britain, Katyń came to symbolize a myriad meanings from the Nazi
“discovery” of the mass graves in the Katyń Forest in April 1943 to a symbol of protest prior to
the fall of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Though the aims of Goebbels’
Katyń propaganda campaign of a united Polish-German front against the Soviet Union were not
effective in Poland, the propaganda campaign’s language, documentation, and representations of
Katyń made a lasting impact on the memory making processes of Katyń throughout Polish
diasporic communities and Poland. Within contributions made to the historical understanding of
Katyń by Polish émigrés, like Władysław Anders and J.K. Zawodny, we see that the act of
writing history is a dual project of history and memory making. Émigrés’ contributions, like
Zbrodnia Katyńska, were smuggled into the PRL by the Polish underground in a clandestine
effort to expose the “truth” of Katyń in Polish society. In locations, like the Powązkowski
Military Cemetery in Warsaw, a “war of monuments” occurred between Poles and the
government over the Katyń dead. During the Solidarność period, Katyń became a symbol of
77

protest utilized by movements like Solidarność against the communist backed government of the
PRL.
Following the release of the Katyń documents in 1990 and 1992, Katyń has continued to
be a significant symbol in the memory landscape of present-day Poland. Memorials to the Katyń
dead were erected in cities across Poland, like Wadowice and Kraków. Katyń has been the
subject of many works of literature, art, and films in Poland, like Andrzej Wajda’s Katyń. In the
aftermath of the 2010 plane crash near Smolensk, Katyń came to symbolize two national
tragedies to the Polish nation. Over seventy years following the mass executions of the 21,000+
Polish military and members of the intelligentsia throughout the Soviet Union, Katyń continues
to serve as a representation of national suffering, loss, and anxiety in Polish collective memories.
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Figure 1: Katyń Memorial, Kraków, Polska. Photograph taken by Amanda Nicole
Alarcon, July 2017.

88

Figure 2: Katyń Memorial, Kraków, Polska. Photograph taken by Amanda Nicole
Alarcon, July 2017.
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Figure 3: Katyń Memorial, Wadowice, Polska. Photograph taken by Amanda Nicole
Alarcon, July 2017.
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